Climate change and renewable energy as a super trump for EU trade law. All Essent clear by Van Calster, Geert
RELP 1|201460 Climate Change and Renewable Energy as a Super Trump for EU Trade Law
Climate Change and Renewable Energy as a
Super Trump for EU Trade Law
However all Essent clear
Geert van Calster*
Essent, Joined Cases C-204/12 to C-208/12,1 in conjunction with Case C-573/12
Ålands Vindkraft,2 completes the promotion of climate change governance as a super trump
in the application of European Union trade law. The cycle arguably started with Outokom-
pu Oy,3 followed by PreussenElektra.4 In contrast with Ålands Vindkraft, however, judgment
in Essent does clearly instruct the referring judge to review outstanding issues. These focus
in particular on the openmarket aspects of the regional scheme at issue. Moreover, the Court
of Justice has not unequivocally held on key aspects of the general application of exceptions
to free movement issues.
I. The general context. Climate change
and renewable energy as exceptions
to EU trade law. The ECJ’s
discouragement of tax inOutokumpu
and its encouragement of non-tax
restrictions to trade in PreussenElektra
Climate change regulation evidently is a pinnacle of
the EU’s environmental policy. Generally, environ-
mental measures often provoke tension with interna-
tional and EU trade rules. This is largely explained by
the fact that in itshistoricalorigins, international trade
tended to ignore any negative externalities. ‘Domestic
regulatory autonomy’, whether it be for environmen-
tal, healthandsafety, or consumerprotectiongrounds,
typically functions as an exception to free trade rules,
rather than as an inherent characteristic of it.
A deep integration system like the EU seeks to pre-
vent trade tensions resulting from unilateral initia-
tives, by ‘positively harmonising’ legislation in these
areas. This provides at the least a minimum ceiling
in national laws, at the most the replacement of na-
tional laws by one, common legal standard. (In the
EU, consumer protection law is a case in point for
the latter. Environmental law a typical example of
the former).
Specifically in the area of promoting renewable
energy with a view to addressing climate change, al-
ready prior to EU harmonisation in this area, Mem-
berStates, too, rolledout anumberof regulatorymea-
sures. The confrontation of these national measures
with EU trade law, arguably started with Outokumpu
Oy.
1. Outokumpu Oy. A strict ECJ view on
border (energy) tax adjustments
National environmental priorities, as well as interna-
tional commitments to reduce the emission of green-
house gases, have led to the increased use of ‘smart’
energy taxation. In particular in OECD countries,
States aim to encourage among others the use of re-
newable sources of energy, through a layered system
of taxation. Such system targets less environmental-
ly friendly forms of energy, with a higher rate of tax-
ation.
Competitiveness concernsof suchagreen taxation
regime, would normally be offset by Border Tax Ad-
justment (BTA). However in the energy sector, BTA
is complicated by the fact that one cannot distinguish
* Professor at the University of Leuven and independent legal
practitioner, www.gavclaw.com.
1 Essent Belgium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elec-
triciteits- en Gasmarkt et al, not yet published in ECR.
2 Case C-573/12, Ålands Vindkraft AB v Energimyndigheten, not
yet published in ECR.
3 Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy, [1998] ECR I-1801.
4 Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schhleswag AG, [2001] ECR
I-2099.
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the method of production from the final product. In
trade law jargon this is known as ‘non-product relat-
ed production processes and –methods’ or ‘n-Pr
PPMs’: the way in which, in the case at issue, elec-
tricity is produced is not visible in the final product.
In Outokumpu Oy, the ECJ adopted a strict ap-
proach to Member States’ use of tax instruments to
distinguish between renewable or fossil and nuclear
sources of electricity.5 Under Finnish legislation on
the taxation of energy, excise duty on electricity was
levied in Finland on electrical energy produced do-
mestically, the amount of the duty depending on the
method of production.6 On imported electricity, the
excise duty charged, regardless of themethod of pro-
duction of the electricity, was a set duty, higher than
the lowest excise duty chargeable on electricity pro-
duced in Finland, but lower than the highest excise
duty chargeable on such electricity.
This called into question the application of Arti-
cle 110 TFEU (at the time, Article 90 TEC):
No Member State shall impose, directly or indi-
rectly, on the products of otherMember States any
internal taxation of any kind in excess of that im-
posed directly or indirectly on similar domestic
products.
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on
the products of other Member States any internal
taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect pro-
tection to other products.
The ECJ accepted the principle that the rate of an in-
ternal tax on electricity may vary according to the
manner in which the electricity is produced and the
rawmaterials used for its production, in so far as that
differentiation is based on environmental consider-
ations. However, it referred to earlier case-law which
states that Article 110 is infringed where the taxation
on the imported product and that on the similar do-
mestic product are calculated in a different manner
on the basis of different criteria which lead, even if
only in certain cases, to higher taxation being im-
posed on the imported product.7
Practical difficulties in levying the same kind of
tax, in particular because of the specific nature of
electricity and the difficulty to determine themethod
of production of imported electricity, could not jus-
tify the infringement. The Court also seemed to at-
tach particular weight to the fact that the Finnish leg-
islation did not even give the importer the opportu-
nity of demonstrating that the electricity imported
by him has been produced by a particular method in
order to qualify for the rate applicable to electricity
of domestic origin produced by the same method.
InOutokumpu Oy the ECJ applied the condition of
non-discrimination strictly. Thiswas an approachnot
altogether absent from previous case-law. Haahr Pe-
troleum too, applied Article 110 TFEU strictly.8 Here,
the Court held that national legislation can only be
compatible with Article 110 if it excludes higher tax-
ation of imported products in all instances. This strict
approach was subsequently confirmed, for instance
in Grundig Italiana.9 It represents a firm belief in a
de facto interpretation of the condition of non-dis-
crimination,where the legislator’s intent is irrelevant.
The Court’s attitude was less absolute in other in-
stances, where the nature of the tax regime was held
to bemore important than its actual consequences.10
Chemial Farmaceutici (see further, below) is a case
in point. Generally, the Court had not, prior to the
Outokumpu line of cases, employed non-discrimina-
tion as a separate condition in the three-tier test un-
der Article 110.11 Rather it assessed this condition in
conjunction with the other two. This bundling of the
5 Note 4 above.
6 The highest for electricity produced by nuclear power, lower for
electricity produced by water power; for electricity produced by
other methods, for example from coal, excise duty was charged
on the basis of the amount of input materials used to produce the
electricity; finally, for electrical energy produced by some meth-
ods, for example in a generator with an output below two mega-
volt-amperes, no excise duty at all was charged.
7 Among others Case C-152/89 Commission v Luxembourg, [1991]
ECR I-3141, at 20.
8 Case C-90/94, [1997] ECR I-4058.
9 Case C-68/96 Grundig Italiana SpA v Minestero delle Finanze,
[1997] ECR I-3797.
10 See e.g. Case 106/84 Commission v Denmark, [1986] ECR 833
(where the products subject to the highest tax rate were, due to
their nature, all imported); Case 277/83 Commission v Italy,
[1985] ECR 2049 (where imported products were excluded from
qualification for a number of fiscal advantages); and Joined Cases
12 and 143/80 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v
Essevi SpA and Carlo Salengo, [1981] ECR 1413 (where tax
advantages where dependent on the inspection of production
processes, in situ, by the authorities of the importing State).
11 The Court’s general application of Article 110 holds that EU law
does not restrict the freedom of each Member State to lay down
tax arrangements which differentiate between certain products on
the basis of objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw mate-
rials used or the production processes employed. Such differentia-
tion is compatible with EU law
– if it is based on objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw
materials used or the production processes employed; and
– if it pursues economic or social policy objectives which are
themselves compatible with the requirements of the Treaty and
secondary law, and
– if the detailed rules are such as to avoid any form of discrimina-
tion, direct or indirect, in regard to imports from other Member
States or any form of protection of domestic products.
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three elements of the test, was severed by the judg-
ments inHaahr Petroleum,Grundig Italiana andOut-
okumpu Oy.
More specifically with respect to environmental
taxation, the AG and the Finnish Government had
suggested leniency, in the light of the ecological ob-
jectives of the regulations, and of technical difficul-
ties coinciding with the nature of electricity.12 The
Court dismissed practical and technical difficulties.
Rather than imposing a tax, calculated as a national
average, Finland should have imposed the lowest tax
rate on imported products. (Jacobs AG had suggest-
ed an improved version of the Finnish technique,
whichwould have imposed an average taxwhichwas
a better reflection of the true proportion of Finnish
products subject to the various tax levels. It would
have been amended on a regular basis, to reflect
changing consumption patterns).
The Court’s clarification of the condition of non-
discrimination and absence of protective effect, is of
particular relevance for a substantial part of environ-
mental taxes. An important part of those taxes aims
to eliminate or at least limit the national production
of a particular type of product. InChemial Farmaceu-
tici13 the Court accepted that there was no discrimi-
nation, even thoughdomesticproducts only fellwith-
in the advantaged category of the Italian fiscal legis-
lation at stake. It reasoned that the tax treatment did
apply todomestic productionof thedisfavouredkind
(production of denatured alcohol by means of the
synthetic process), in that it had the effect of prevent-
ing such production from arising.
In other words the room offered by the Court
would seem to guarantee that only the most brutal
environmental taxes, those where the national pro-
duction is virtually eliminated (where that was the
objective of the tax), do not stumble over EU law hur-
dles. HoweverChemial Farmaceutici did not not lead
to a series of similar decisions, and its impact is there-
fore unclear. The decision in Outokumpu Oy in par-
ticular, points to a rather less open approach to envi-
ronmental taxation.
2. PreussenElektra
PreussenElektra14 showed the Court in a very lenient
mood vis-à-vis German measures which prima facie
did not seem passable under the Treaty’s Articles on
the free movement of goods.
PreussenElektra concerned the German Feeding-
in Act 1990 (Stromeinspeisungsgesetz). The Act in-
tervened both in the demand side of the market and
in the price paid for the electricity concerned. Elec-
tricity suppliers which operate a general supply net-
work were obliged, within certain limits, to purchase
the electricity produced in their area of supply from
renewable sources of energy and to pay compensa-
tion for those inputs of electricity in accordancewith
a number of parameters. The minimum price varied
between 65 and 90% of the average sales price per
kilowatt hour of electricity supplied to all final cus-
tomers by electricity supply undertakings.
The regime did have an in-built safeguard (‘hard-
ship clause’): in so far as the kilowatt hours to be com-
pensated for exceeded 5% of the total kilowatt hours
supplied by the electricity supplier through its net-
work during a calendar year, the upstream network
operator was obliged to reimburse the supplemen-
tary costs. The European Commission (‘EC’) had re-
garded the system as being an acceptable form of
State Aid, among others in view of its relatively small
impact (given the limited share of the energy con-
cerned in the overall electricity market). However, in
view of the increase in this share, the Commission
was in the process of reviewing this decision.
Schleswag sourced almost its entire supply of elec-
tricity fromPreussenElektra. Froman original 0,77%
in 1991, the share of wind energy rose to 15% in 1998.
Schleswag consequently claimed a substantial
amount from PreussenElektra, in accordance with
thehardshipclause.PreussenElektrahoweverargued
that the relevant part of theAct amounted to a change
in the State Aid regime, which had not been sepa-
rately notified to the EC. I will not further review the
State aid element of the case here, given that they are
less relevant for the purposes of comparisonwith Es-
sent.
With respect to the Internal Market aspects of the
case, given that distributorswere obliged to purchase
electricity produced within the territory in which
they are active, there is no doubt that intra-EU trade
12 Once produced, it is impossible for the authorities to deduct,
from the very electricity presented, the production process that
was used in manufacturing it.
13 Case 140/79, Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v DAF SpA., [1981] ECR
1.
14 Note 4 above.
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was affected. However, the Court found these restric-
tions to be justified, in view of two parameters: the
aim of the regime (environmental protection) as well
as the specific characteristics of the EU electricity
market at the time of the judgment.
The environmental credentials of the regulations,
as identified by theCourt,were indeed rather impres-
sive: the increased use of renewable sources of ener-
gy is a central part of the EU’s commitment to tack-
ling climate change; this is obviously beneficial for
the environment (one of the mandatory require-
ments of the Court’s rule of reason) – it also fosters
the life and health humans, animals and plants (one
of the exceptions provided for in Article 36 TFEU).
The Court also referred to the integration principle,
to emphasise the importance of an ‘environmentally
conscious’ Internal Market. Finally, the Directive on
the Internal Market in electricity applicable at the
time15 specified that Member States may give prior-
ity to the production of electricity from renewable
sources of energy.
The recognition of the positive environmental im-
pact of renewable energy was not surprising. What
remains however controversial, is whether such hin-
drance of the Internal Market is proportionate. The
Court in PreussenElektra did not conduct a propor-
tionality test, lest its references to the characteristics
of the electricity market had to be understood in a
proportionality context. In this respect the Court not-
ed
– that the liberalisation of the electricitymarket was
as yet in an intermediary phase only; and
– that the nature of electricity is such that, once it
has been allowed into the transmission or distrib-
ution system, it is difficult to determine its origin
and in particular the source of energy fromwhich
it was produced. It also referred to the Proposal at
the time for a Directive on the promotion of elec-
tricity from renewable energy sources in the inter-
nal electricity market, that the implementation in
each Member State of a system of certificates of
origin for electricity produced from renewable
sources, capable of being the subject of mutual
recognition, was essential in order to make trade
in that type of electricity both reliable and possi-
ble in practice.
In otherwords, the Court urged a solution to the tech-
nical challenge of presenting reliable certificates of
origin.
PreussenElektra is especially noteworthy in that
the Court’s evaluation of the national measure with-
in the context of Article 34-36 TFEU, is much milder
than its similar considerations under Article 110
TFEU (Outokumpu Oy).
3. Intermediate conclusion. Rien n’est
absolu que le provisoire
PreussenElektramayhave seemed likegoodcase-law
only for as long as no reliable system of certificates
of origin existed. However, rien n’est absolu que le
provisoire: as Vindkraft and Essent show,
PreussenElektra kick-started a more flexible ap-
proachwith respect to non-tax restrictions to the free
movement of goods – even if such as in
PreussenElektra they are blunt and disproportion-
ate.
II. Ålands Vindkraft and Essent. A clear
preference for market-based
renewable energy support
Bot AG opined in both Vindkraft and Essent, with Es-
sent first, followed byVindkraft. The Court itself held
in Vindkraft first, followed by Essent.
1. Bot AG in Essent: Call for an explicit
reversal of Cassis de Dijon,
nevertheless rejection of the Flemish
scheme on the merits
In Essent, Bot AG summarised the questions referred
as whether the Flemish support scheme for renew-
able energy, which grants renewable energy certifi-
cates to producers of such energy only if they are lo-
cated in the Flemish Region, and which obliges elec-
tricity distributors to surrender a minimum amount
of such certificates without being able to offer such
certificates obtained in other EU Member States, is
compatible with the free movement of goods and
with theEU’snon-discriminationprinciple.Directive
2001/7716 regulates both renewable energy (or
‘green’) certificates – which are used by a Member
15 Directive 96/62, OJ [1997] L27/20.
16 OJ [2001] L283/33.
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State to show its meeting its obligations to produce
a minimum amount of electricity from renewable
sources – and certificates of origin, which allow an
electricity distributors to prove that x amount of its
electricity distributed, originates from renewable en-
ergy.
The AG did not entertain at length the issue of
whether renewable certificates in themselves quali-
fy as ‘goods’ under the Treaty. The Flemish system
may definitely have an impact on the import of
‘green’ electricity, with the latter undeniably having
been held to be a ‘good’ under the protection of the
free movement of goods. If the certificates scheme
unjustifiably restricts the free movement of goods, it
would at any rate be illegal and in need of proper jus-
tification.
Unlike in PreussenElektra, distributors of electric-
ity could still purchase renewable energy abroad –
however such electricity is oftenmore expensive (for
it doesnot receiveFlemishgovernment support), and
even if distributors were to purchase abroad, they
would still have to surrender, after purchase, the nec-
essary Flemish certificates.
The AG notes that the Court in Preussen Elektra
allowed the German scheme despite it being discrim-
inatory. This might have been an implicit reversal of
the case-law (Cassis de Dijon17) that infringements
of the freemovement of goodsmay only be based on
the court-invented ‘mandatory requirements’ (of
which environmental protection is one; as opposed
to those societal interests which are included in the
explicit list of exceptions of Article 36 TFEU) where
they do not discriminate.18 That it might have been
such reversal leads the AG to suggest, finding sup-
port in the integration principle, that the Court in Es-
sent should make that reversal explicit. My alterna-
tive reading of PreussenElektra, above, suggested
that the judgment was simply poor precedent, espe-
cially given that the court did not only ignore the dis-
criminatorynature of theGermanmeasure, but omit-
ted at the same time to assess its proportionality. The
poor judgment in PreussenElektra, as noted, may be
explained by the series of harmonising measures in
the Internal Market for electricity, which were being
prepared at the time of the judgment andwhich have
since entered the statute books.
Despite the AG suggesting such a rare explicit re-
versal of the Court’s case-law on the free movement
of goods, he did not suggest that in the case at issue,
the infringement is justified.
Among his arguments for rejecting the measure
(which also features the argument that the Flemish
Region violated a promise made at the time the rel-
evant scheme was approved by the European Com-
mission under State aid rules), was also the ‘local pro-
duction’ requirement. Sadly, that relevant Union law
requiresMember States to roll-out their own, nation-
al renewable energy capabilities, has been seized up-
on by proponents of schemes such as the Flemish
one, to argue that discriminative support may be re-
quired to assist industry to work towards that goal.
2. Bot AG in Ålands Vindkraft: Turning
on the heat
Vindkraft concerns the successor to Directive
2001/77 (at stake in Essent), i.e. Directive 2009/28.
TheAdvocateGeneral essentiallyargued that thenew
Directive itself is contrary to EU primary law in al-
lowing Member States to discriminate against for-
eign produced renewable electricity by limiting ac-
cess to their national support scheme to electricity
generated on their territory; and that such illegality
is not backed by the environmental exceptions to the
Treaty.
3. The Court does not follow Bot's lead
in Ålands Vindkraft
TheECJ held inVindkraft on 1 July. It first of all found
that Directive 2009/28 is not exhaustive on the issue
of territorial restrictions of support schemes, hence
requiring assessment under primary EU law. Mem-
ber States can continue to restrict access to their sup-
port schemes (in the strict sense of not rolling out fi-
nancing to renewable energy of foreign origin): this
constitutes an infringement to the free movement of
goods but one which can be justified. As pointed out
above, Bot AG had suggested, finding support in the
integration principle, that the Court in Essent should
make the PreussenElektra implicit reversal of Cassis
de Dijon, explicit. In the end the Court decided Vin-
17 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für
Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649.
18 More detail on the core issues in G. van Calster, International and
EC trade law – The environmental challenge, London, Cameron
May, 2000, 564p..
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dkraft before Essent and simply refers (at 80) to its
Preussen Elektra case law: no explicit reversal.
The Court instead focusses on proportionality. In
that assessment,19 the ECJ emphasises the market-
based elements of the Swedish scheme (the certifi-
cates can be sold separately from the underlying elec-
tricity and the market is operated in a transparent
and liquid fashion). A less market-oriented approach
may not have survived ECJ scrutiny.
4. The Court in Essent puts the ball back
in the national court's camp.
Outcome far from clear
Deciding Vindkraft together with Essent would have
been helpful. Instead, the Court ruled in Essent on 11
September. Like in Vindkraft, it first of all does not
rule on the qualification of certificates of origin as
being ‘goods’ or not: the legislation at any rate hin-
ders the free movement of the electricity underlying
the certificates.
It subsequently basically confirms the main find-
ings of Vindkraft, including the absence of express
reversal of the non-applicability of the Rule of Rea-
son to discriminatory measures. Yes, the Flemish
regime restricts trade. Yes, this can in principle be
justified for environmental reasons. However, the
Court does emphasise the proportionality test. In
Vindkraft, the ECJ itself held the scheme to be com-
patible with the Treaty by virtue essentially of its
highly transparent and market-driven character. In
Essent, however and importantly, this final call is left
to the national judge. The Court does hand the na-
tional court themarkers alongwhich this assessment
needs to be made:
– For the Flemish scheme to meet the proportional-
ity test, it is important that mechanisms be estab-
lishedwhich ensure the creation of a genuinemar-
ket for certificates in which supply can match de-
mand, reaching some kind of balance, so that it is
actually possible for the relevant suppliers to ob-
tain certificates under fair terms (at 112).
– Furthermore, the fine in the absence of quota ful-
filment must not impose excessive penalties im-
posed on the traders concerned (at 114).
The Swedish scheme, held to be compatible with EU
economic law, does differ rather drastically from the
Flemish scheme, whichmay not qualify as a genuine
market operating under fair and transparent terms.
There is arguably quite an imbalance between for-
eign and domestic suppliers. Most of the larger sup-
pliers in the Flemish Region also operate as produc-
ers. This makes the market and its prices subject to
the overall strategy of these suppliers /producers.
They chose whether their producers' certificates are
kept for meeting their own obligation to surrender
certificates, as being a supplier; or whether these are
sold on a bilateral basis (to competitor-suppliers), via
the energy stock exchange, or via the grid operator
guaranteeing a legal minimum price for certificates.
Such variety of strategies in managing one's certifi-
cates stock is not open to suppliers producing out-
side of the Flemish Region. These can only buy cer-
tificates as such, and have to do so to a considerable
extent from competitors on the supply market.
Moreover, producer-suppliers are able to sell cer-
tificates along with electricity (as a package deal).
They can also chose to sell them separately. Foreign
producers do not have the package choice.
Alongside the observation that in the past the reg-
ulator concerned has refused any non-Flemish cer-
tificate, it is in my view quite doubtful that the Flem-
ish regime actually functions as the open, transpar-
ent and effective market which the ECJ requires. In
many ways the mechanism is very similar to a stan-
dard feed-in tariff scheme, arguably falling far short
of the requirements of the ECJ.
III. Conclusion
The lack of explicit reversal of Cassis de Dijon is un-
fortunate.20 We are now left to ponder whether
Preussen Elektra /Vindkraft /Essent) needs distin-
guishing: do renewable energy /Kyoto /UNFCCC
commitments stand out from other regulatory re-
quirements, in no longer insisting on non-discrimi-
natory measures, or has this condition now been
dropped for all 'mandatory requirements?'
Further, in both Vindkraft and Essent the Court in-
sists on market-based instruments being required to
19 See also C. Banet's analysis on http://www.ecohz.com/facts-news/
news/aaland-case/, 3 July 2014, last consulted 21 September
2014.
20 On this issue see also F. Fontanelli, ''The Essent judgment: Anoth-
er revolution in the case-law on free movement of goods?', EU
Law Analysis, S. Peers ed., www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.be, last
consulted 21 September 2014.
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justify the market infringement. The final outcome
of the Essent case is quite uncertain. I for one would
have liked the ECJ itself to have highlighted the cru-
cial differences between the Swedish and the Flem-
ish scheme, and to have concluded disproportionali-
ty itself.
